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OPINION
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
At issue in this appeal is whether all charges imposed
by electronic discovery vendors to assist in the collection,
processing, and production of electronically stored
information (―ESI‖) are taxable against a losing party as
―[f]ees for exemplification [or] the costs of making copies of
any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for
use in the case.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). We have not
previously addressed this issue, and the courts that have
considered this question have reached conflicting results.
Compare, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., No. 2:06-CV1732-LDD, 2011 WL 4793239, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011)
(―We . . . award costs for the creation of a litigation database,
storage of data, imaging hard drives, keyword searches,
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deduplication, data extraction and processing.‖), with Rawal
v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 07 C 5561, 2012 WL 581146, at
*2-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2012) (refusing to award electronic
processing costs as taxable).
The District Court in this case concluded that more
than $365,000 in charges imposed by the electronic discovery
vendors, covering such activities as hard drive imaging, data
processing, keyword searching, and file format conversion,
are taxable, without differentiating between those charges that
constitute ―[f]ees for exemplification,‖ and the charges that
constitute ―costs of making copies.‖ § 1920(4). In view of
the significant role that electronic discovery plays in litigation
today, involving the collection, processing, and production of
huge volumes of data generated as a result of the information
technology and communication revolutions, we believe it
imperative to provide definitive guidance to the district courts
in our Circuit on the question of the extent to which electronic
discovery expenses are taxable.1 We conclude that none of
1

In 2004, it was estimated that approximately 95% of
all documents were created by electronic means. See, e.g.,
James M. Evangelista, Polishing the “Gold Standard” on the
e-Discovery Cost-Shifting Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg, LLC, 9 J. Tech. L & Pol‘y 1, 2 (2004). More
importantly, the ease with which ESI is created, distributed,
duplicated, and stored has resulted in exponentially greater
volumes of data that must be assembled, analyzed, and
produced in litigation. See The Sedona Conference, The
Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8
Sedona Conf. J. 189, 193 (2007) (―The shift of information
storage to a digital realm has . . . caused an explosion in the
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amount of information that resides in any enterprise[,]
profoundly affecting litigation.‖). It is estimated that in 2011,
1.8 zettabytes of data were created, the equivalent of 57.5
billion iPads, each with thirty-two gigabytes of storage. See
Press Release, EMC Corp., World‘s Data More than
Doubling Every Two Years—Driving Big Data Opportunity,
New IT Roles (June 8, 2011), available at
http://www.emc.com/about/news/press/2011/2011062801.htm (citing John Gantz & David Reinsel, IDC, 2011
Digital Universe Study: Extracting Value from Chaos
(2011)). The burden and expense thus far associated with
discovery of ESI has resulted in changes to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and to the adoption of Federal Rule of
Evidence 502, the rules governing discovery in a number of
states, the adoption of proposed uniform rules by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and
the promulgation of standards by the American Bar
Association. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory
committee‘s note (2006 amendments) (explaining changes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the impact of the
exponential growth in recoverable information); Fed. R. Evid.
502 advisory committee‘s note (explaining the adoption of
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 to respond, in part, to the
proliferation of electronic information); Dan H. Willoughby
et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers,
60 Duke L.J. 789, 791 n.3 (2010) (discussing discovery rule
changes in several states due to ESI); Nat‘l Conference of
Comm‘rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Rules Relating to the
Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (2007),
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/b11/archives/ulc/udoera/2007
final.pdf; American Bar Association Civil Discovery
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the electronic discovery vendors‘ activities in this case can be
regarded as ―exemplification‖ of materials. We further
conclude that only scanning and file format conversion can be
considered to be ―making copies,‖ an activity that amounts to
approximately $30,000 of the more than $365,000 in
electronic discovery charges taxed in this case. Accordingly,
we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter
to the District Court to reduce the cost award accordingly.
I.
In September of 2007, Appellant Race Tires America,
Inc. (―RTA‖), a tire supplier, sued Appellees Hoosier Racing
Tire Corp. (―Hoosier‖), a competitor, and Dirt Motor Sports,
Inc. d/b/a World Racing Group (―DMS‖), a motorsports
sanctioning body. RTA asserted violations of Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, arising out of the
adoption of a ―single tire rule‖ for certain motorsports and the
related exclusive supply contracts for race tires between
Hoosier and a number of sanctioning bodies, including DMS.
RTA estimated that damages, before trebling, exceeded $30
million.

Standard § 29 cmt. (2004) (discussing the 2004 amendments
to the American Bar Association Civil Discovery Standards
to facilitate electronic discovery).
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As would be expected in a case of this nature and
magnitude, the parties engaged in extensive discovery of ESI.
The Case Management Order (―CMO‖), issued by the District
Court in January of 2008, directed the parties to attempt to
agree upon a list of keyword search terms, with a party‘s use
of such terms carrying a presumption that it had fulfilled its
―obligation to conduct a reasonable search.‖ (A. 79.) The
CMO further provided that, unless native file format was
―reasonably necessary to enable the other parties to review
those files,‖ (A. 80), ESI was to ―be produced in ‗Tagged
Image File Format,‘‖ accompanied by ―[a] cross reference or
unitization file, in standard format (e.g. Opticon, Summation
DII, or the like) showing the Bates number of each page and
the appropriate unitization of the documents.‖2 (A. 79.) The
CMO further identified specific metadata fields that had to be
produced if reasonably available.3 (A. 79-80.) Finally, the
2

The native file format is the ―file structure defined by
the original creating application,‖ such as a document created
and opened in a word processing application. The Sedona
Conference, The Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery
& Digital Information Management 35 (Sherry B. Harris et
al. eds., 3rd ed. 2010). Tagged Image File Format (―TIFF‖) is
―[a] widely used and supported graphic file format[] for
storing bit-mapped images, with many different compression
formats and resolutions.‖ Id. at 50. TIFF ―[i]mages are
stored in tagged fields, and programs use the tags to accept or
ignore fields, depending on the application.‖ Id. Unitization
is ―[t]he assembly of individually scanned pages into
documents.‖ Id. at 52.
3

Metadata is ―[d]ata typically stored electronically that
describes characteristics of ESI, found in different places in
different forms.‖ The Sedona Conference, supra note 2, at
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CMO directed the parties to produce ―[a]n extracted text file
or searchable version . . . for each electronic document in a
document level text file (except for any file produced in
native format).‖4 (A. 80.)
Hoosier and DMS each retained separate vendors to
assist with the production of ESI.5 Specifically, DMS
34. While ―[s]ome metadata, such as file dates and sizes, can
easily be seen by users[,] other metadata can be hidden or
embedded and unavailable to computer users who are not
technically adept.‖ Id. For example, in this case, the District
Court ordered the parties to produce ―metadata fields
associated with each electronic document . . . where
reasonably available,‖ including, in part, the fields of
―BegDoc,‖ ―EndDoc,‖ ―BegAttach,‖ ―EndAttach,‖ ―Author,‖
―BCC,‖ ―CC,‖ ―Company,‖ ―Custodian Name,‖ ―Date
Created,‖ ―Date Last Modified,‖ and ―Edit Time.‖ (A. 7879.) Allowing discovery of these metadata fields permitted
the parties to seek information that may not have been
available in the documents‘ text.
4

An extracted text file is a file containing text taken
from an original electronic document. See The Sedona
Conference, supra note 2, at 12 (defining ―[d]ata
[e]xtraction‖).
5

Electronic discovery has spawned much more than
―[a] cottage industry.‖ Hopson v. City of Balt., 232 F.R.D.
228, 239 n.32 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting T. Delaney, E-Mail
Discovery: The Duties, Danger and Expense, 46 Fed. Lawyer
42, 44 (Jan. 1999)). For the year 2009, electronic discovery
vendors had revenues equaling approximately $2.8 billion.
See Arin Greenwood, Law Practice: A New View, Part 2: E-

8

retained Capital City Consulting (―CCC‖), a North Carolina
firm, and Hoosier retained Preferred Imaging and Xact Data
Discovery.
Based upon the vendors‘ invoices, RTA
categorized the activities conducted by the vendors as
follows:
(1) preservation and collection of ESI; (2)
processing the collected ESI; (3) keyword searching; (4)
culling privileged material; (5) scanning and TIFF
conversion; (6) optical character recognition (―OCR‖)
conversion; and (7) conversion of racing videos from VHS
format to DVD format.6
In total, Hoosier produced 430,733 pages of ESI, and
DMS produced 178,413 documents in electronic format. In
addition, ten DVDs of racing videos were produced. Hoosier
paid its electronic discovery vendors, Preferred Imaging and
Xact Data Discovery, more than $125,000. DMS claims to
have incurred more than $240,000 in charges from CCC.
Discovery concluded on January 30, 2009. DMS and
Hoosier each then moved for summary judgment. On
Discovery Changes Have Some Seeing a Career in Document
Review, 97 A.B.A. J. 27, 27 (2011) (citing George Socha &
Tom Gelbmann, 2010 Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery
Survey (2010)).
6

OCR is ―[a] technology process that translates and
converts printed matter on an image into a format that a
computer can manipulate . . . and, therefore, renders that
matter text searchable.‖ The Sedona Conference, supra note
2, at 37.
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September 15, 2009, the District Court granted the defense
summary judgment motions. We affirmed the District
Court‘s decision on July 23, 2010. See Race Tires Am., Inc.
v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 85 (3d Cir. 2010).
Following completion of the appeals process, the Clerk
for the District Court proceeded to consider the Bills of Costs
that had been presented by DMS and Hoosier pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). On the line of the Bill
of Costs form for ―[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of
making copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case,‖ DMS claimed
$329,051.41 (A. 143), and Hoosier claimed $143,007.05. (A.
82.) In response to RTA‘s objection to the DMS Bill of
Costs, DMS acknowledged that the invoices of its vendor,
CCC, ―were exceedingly confusing and inconsistent.‖ (A.
268.) As a result, DMS ―mistakenly included duplicate
invoices,‖ and asserted that ―its actual e-discovery costs
[were] $241,139.37,‖ an amount that was almost $88,000 less
than its original claim. (A. 268.)
The Clerk of the District Court, in his Taxation of
Costs, stated that ―[t]his is the first case in the Western
District of Pennsylvania that a party has requested [that
electronic discovery] costs be taxed.‖ (A. 29.) Noting that
there was no precedent on this issue from this Court, and that
the district courts across the country are divided on the issue,
and further observing that the CMO set forth procedures for
complying with electronic discovery requests, the Clerk
concluded that electronic discovery costs would be
―consider[ed] . . . taxable, as opposed to just . . . the costs of
litigating.‖ (A. 30.) In support of this conclusion, the Clerk
distinguished the Western District of Pennsylvania‘s general
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rule disallowing copying charges as ―office expenses and part
of the costs of litigation,‖ (A. 21) (citing Krouse v. American
Sterilizer Co., 928 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Pa. 1996)), stating that
―the requirements and expertise necessary to retrieve and
prepare these e-discovery documents [were] an indispensable
part of the process.‖ (A. 30.)
Of the $143,007.05 sought by Hoosier, the Clerk taxed
the amount of $125,580.55. It reduced the claim for ―copy
charges‖ appearing in a general ledger with no supporting
detail, as well as charges for services performed by Hoosier‘s
law firm‘s Litigation Support Department, including OCR
conversion, TIFF conversion, and electronic data discovery
processing because, the Clerk explained, ―these items were
not done by a third party, and therefore are part of the costs of
litigating.‖7 (A. 31.) As to DMS, the Clerk awarded its full
request of ―e-discovery fees . . . in the amount of
$241,778.81.‖ (A. 32.)
RTA responded to the Clerk‘s taxation of costs by
filing with the District Court a Motion to Appoint Special
Master Regarding E-Discovery Issues and a Motion to
Review Taxation of Costs. In a Memorandum Opinion issued
on May 6, 2011, the District Court declined to appoint a
Special Master and affirmed the Clerk‘s taxation of the
electronic discovery vendor charges. See Race Tires Am.,
Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011
WL 1748620, at *12 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011). After
commenting on the contentious nature of the discovery and
the extensive amount of ESI produced during the litigation,
7

Hoosier did not contest the Clerk‘s reductions to its
Bill of Costs.
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and canvassing the extant case law, the District Court
concluded that the entire amounts charged by the electronic
discovery vendors were taxable. Id. In reaching this result,
the District Court essentially found that ―the steps the thirdparty vendor(s) performed appeared to be the electronic
equivalent of exemplification and copying,‖ (id. at *8),
reiterating the Clerk of Court‘s comment that ―the
requirements and expertise necessary to retrieve and prepare .
. . e-discovery documents for production were an
indispensable part of the discovery process.‖ Id. at *9.
Without assessing each of the discrete functions performed by
the vendors, the District Court also concluded that the
vendors‘ charges were ―necessarily incurred and reasonable.‖
Id. at *10. In support of this conclusion, the District Court
noted that the amounts charged by the vendors in this case
were ―within the parameters set forth in the case law.‖ Id.
Finally, the District Court made clear that it regarded its
taxation of electronic discovery vendor costs as not
establishing a precedent as to ―how this Court or any other
member of this Court will rule on future disputes regarding
costs of e-discovery,‖ explaining that it regarded ―the facts
and circumstances of this case [to be] unique.‖ Id. at *12.
RTA timely appealed the District Court‘s taxation of
the electronic discovery vendor charges.
We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) states that
―[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or court order provides
otherwise, costs—other than attorney‘s fees—should be
allowed to the prevailing party.‖ Although Rule 54(d)(1)
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stipulates that ―costs . . . should be allowed to the prevailing
party,‖ (emphasis added), Congress, in 28 U.S.C. § 1920,
specified the litigation expenses that qualify as taxable
―costs.‖ See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482
U.S. 437, 441 (1987) (―[Section] 1920 defines the term
‗costs‘ as used in Rule 54(d).‖). Section 1920 provides:
A judge or clerk of any court of
the United States may tax as costs
the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2)
Fees
for
printed
or
electronically recorded transcripts
necessarily obtained for use in the
case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for
printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and
the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the
case;
(5) Docket fees under section
1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court
appointed experts, compensation
of interpreters, and salaries, fees,
expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under
section 1828 of this title.
At issue in this case is § 1920(4), ―[f]ees for
exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
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materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in
the case.‖ Following the example of the late Judge Edward
Becker in addressing other issues pertaining to the taxation of
costs, we first examine ―a page of history‖ to assist us in our
understanding of § 1920(4). In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 456 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting N.Y. Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)) (―Upon this point a
page of history is worth a volume of logic.‖).
Section 1920 is the modern codification of the Fee Act
of 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161-69 (1853). See Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 255 (1975).
Prior to the 1853 Act, the federal courts‘ taxation of costs
against losing litigants conformed to the state rules governing
such matters, resulting in ―great diversity in practice among
the courts and . . . losing litigants . . . being unfairly saddled
with exorbitant fees for the victor‘s attorney.‖ Id. at 251. To
avoid these problems, ―Congress undertook to standardize the
costs allowable in federal litigation.‖ Id. ―The result was a
far-reaching Act specifying in detail the nature and amount of
the taxable items of cost in the federal courts.‖ Id. at 251-52.
The 1853 Act embodied the American ―depart[ure]
from the English practice of attempting to provide the
successful litigant with total reimbursement.‖ 10 Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L.
Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2665 (3d ed.
1998). The ―American rule‖ against shifting the expense of
litigation to the losing party is ―founded on the egalitarian
concept of providing relatively easy access to the courts to all
citizens and reducing the threat of liability for litigation
expenses as an obstacle to the commencement of a lawsuit or
the assertion of a defense that might have some merit.‖ Id.
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The ―substance [of the 1853 Act], without any
apparent intent to change the controlling rules, was . . .
included in the Revised [Judicial] Code of 1948 as 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1920 and 1923(a).‖ Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S.
at 255. In Crawford Fitting Co., the Court reiterated its
understanding that ―[t]he comprehensive scope of the [1853]
Act and the particularity with which it was drafted
demonstrated . . . that Congress meant to impose rigid
controls on cost-shifting in federal courts.‖ 482 U.S. at 444.
In holding that expert witness fees are not taxable under §
1920(3) as ―[f]ees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses,‖ the Crawford Fitting Co. Court essentially
―rejected a line of authority recognizing other possible
sources for an award of costs, including local rules, the
custom of the district, and the court‘s general equitable
powers.‖ 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal
Practice § 54.103(3)(a) (3rd ed. 1999).
Section 1920 thus ―define[s] the full extent of a federal
court‘s power to shift litigation costs absent express statutory
authority.‖ W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,
86 (1991). ―[W]hether a particular expense falls within the
purview of section 1920, and thus may be taxed in the first
place, is an issue of statutory construction, subject to de novo
review.‖ Synopsys, Inc. v. Ricoh Co. (In re Ricoh Co. Patent
Litig.), 661 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Summit
Tech., Inc. v. Nidek Co., 435 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
The question presented here is whether § 1920(4)
authorizes the taxation of an electronic discovery consultant‘s
charges for data collection, preservation, searching, culling,
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conversion, and production as either the ―exemplification [or]
the . . . making [of] copies of any materials where the copies
are necessarily obtained for use in the case.‖ § 1920(4). This
language first appeared in § 3 of the 1853 Act, which in part
provided that the ―lawful fees for exemplifications and copies
of papers necessarily obtained for use on trial . . . shall be
taxed by a judge or clerk of the court.‖ 10 Stat. 168. Section
3‘s language was carried over through to the 1948 revision of
the Judicial Code with two substantive changes. See
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 955
(1948).
The 1948 Act broadened the recoverable
exemplification and copy fees from those ―obtained for use
on trials‖ to those ―obtained for use in the case.‖ Id. It also
replaced the mandatory language of the prior statute, which
read that costs ―shall be taxed,‖ to provide, consistent with
the discretionary language of Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, that the court ―may tax as costs‖
any of the enumerated categories of expenses. Id.
The subdivision providing for the award of fees for
exemplification and copying costs has been amended only
once since 1948. In 2008, the statute‘s reference to ―copies of
papers‖ was replaced with ―the costs of making copies of any
materials.‖
Judicial Administration and Technical
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-406, § 6, 122 Stat.
4291 (2008) (emphasis added). This amendment to § 1920(4)
originated with a recommendation of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management.
See Judicial Conference of the U.S., Report of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 9
(Mar. 18, 2003). The Committee ―was asked to consider
whether the list of taxable costs should be amended to include
expenses associated with new courtroom technologies.‖ Id. at
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9-10. The Committee, ―[c]oncluding that adding the full
range of such costs might go well beyond the intended scope
of the statute, . . . recommended that the [Judicial]
Conference endorse two limited amendments to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920.‖ Id. at 10. One of the two proposed ―limited
amendments‖ was ―to permit taxing the costs associated with
copying materials[,] whether or not they are in paper form.‖
Id.
III.
RTA argues that the electronic discovery costs taxed
against it do not constitute fees for ―exemplification‖ or the
―making of copies.‖ (Appellant‘s Br. 23, 29.) Hoosier and
DMS argue that their incurred electronic discovery costs fall
within the statute‘s allowance for costs for ―exemplification‖
and ―making copies,‖ without drawing any real distinction
between the two terms. (DMS‘s Br. 6, Hoosier‘s Br. 11, 14)
(internal citations omitted). We, however, do not think that
the terms are interchangeable or synonymous. ―It is a wellestablished canon of statutory interpretation that the use of
different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that
Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those
words.‖ S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir.
2003) (citations omitted). As we remarked in Tavarez v.
Klingensmith, ―[i]f possible, we must give effect to every
clause and word of a statute, . . . and be reluctant to treat
statutory terms as surplusage.‖ 372 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir.
2004) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration
omitted).
A.
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Accordingly, we first determine whether the services
for which the District Court taxed costs qualify as
―exemplification‖ of materials.
The courts that have
differentiated ―exemplification‖ from ―making copies‖ in the
context of § 1920(4) have reached different conclusions as to
the term‘s meaning. In Kohus v. Cosco, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Federal Circuit, applying Sixth
Circuit law, reversed an award of the costs for producing a
video exhibit. Observing that ―Congress did not use the
broad phrase ‗demonstrative evidence‘ in section 1920,‖ and
predicting that the Sixth Circuit would apply the narrow
―legal definition‖ of exemplification as ―an official transcript
of a public record, authenticated as a true copy for use as
evidence,‖ id. at 1359 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 593
(7th ed. 1999)), the court ruled that the district court lacked
―statutory authority to award costs for the video.‖ Id.
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted ―exemplification‖
expansively, as ―the act of illustration by example,‖ a
definition ―broad enough to include a wide variety of exhibits
and demonstrative aids.‖ Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211
F.3d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 406 (10th ed. 1993)). Thus, in the
Seventh Circuit, exemplification fees may be awarded ―[s]o
long as the means of presentation furthers the illustrative
purpose of an exhibit.‖ Id. at 428.
There is no need to decide whether Congress used the
term ―exemplification‖ in its narrow ―legal sense,‖ or in the
broader sense adopted by the Seventh Circuit. The electronic
discovery vendors‘ work in this case did not produce
illustrative evidence or the authentication of public records.
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Their charges accordingly would not qualify as fees for
―exemplification‖ under either construction of the term.
B.
We next consider § 1920‘s allowance for the ―costs of
making copies.‖ The noun ―copy‖ is defined as ―an imitation,
transcript, or reproduction of an original work.‖ Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 504 (3rd ed. 1993). The
dictionary definition is consistent with its common use to
denote something that is made to duplicate something else,
usually an ―original.‖ For example, a 2,000-year-old copy of
the Ten Commandments recently went on display in New
York. The term ―copy‖ helps to convey that we are not
referring to the original stone tablets on which the
commandments were inscribed; what is on display is a
parchment copy of the original stone tablets. The word
―copy‖ is frequently utilized to refer to ―photocopies‖ or
―xerox copies‖ – reproductions of documents made using
―copy‖ machines. Indeed, since the advent of photocopying
technology, the allowance for fees for ―copies‖ under
§ 1920(4) has been relied upon by prevailing parties to
recover photocopying costs. See, e.g., Northbrook Excess &
Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 643
(7th Cir. 1991); Tokyo Electron Ariz., Inc. v. Discreet Indus.
Corp., 215 F.R.D. 60, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Gen. Cas. Co. of
Am. v. Stanchfield, 23 F.R.D. 58, 60 (D. Mont. 1959). The
most recent amendment to the statute, however, permitting an
award to the prevailing party of the cost of making copies of
―materials,‖ plainly signifies that § 1920(4)‘s allowance for
copying costs is not limited to paper copying. We must
accordingly decide whether any of the electronic discovery
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vendor charges in this case qualify as the ―costs of making
copies of any materials.‖
The invoices that Hoosier and DMS submitted in
support of their Bills of Costs are notable for their lack of
specificity and clarity as to the services actually performed.
For instance, Preferred Imaging invoices appended to the Bill
of Costs have thousands of dollars in charges for ―EDD
Processing,‖ without explaining what that activity
encompasses. (A. 133.) And while Preferred Image‘s use of
the phrase ―Performing Searching/Filtering/Exporting‖ may
be less obtuse, the invoices provide no indication of the
rationale for these activities, nor their results in terms of the
actual production of discovery material. (A. 133.) These
activities also amount to thousands of dollars in charges. The
CCC invoices are similarly replete with technical jargon that
makes it difficult to decipher what exactly was done. RTA‘s
brief was helpful in categorizing the invoices‘ numerous
entries, and with its guidance, we identify the following
general categories of services comprising the vendors‘
electronic discovery services: collecting and preserving ESI;
processing and indexing ESI; keyword searching of ESI for
responsive and privileged documents; converting native files
to TIFF; and scanning paper documents to create electronic
images.
Of the activities undertaken by the vendors, only the
conversion of native files to TIFF (the agreed-upon default
format for production of ESI), and the scanning of documents
to create digital duplicates are generally recognized as the
taxable ―making copies of material.‖ See, e.g., Hecker v.
Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009) (costs of
―converting computer data into a readable format in response
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to plaintiffs‘ discovery requests . . . are recoverable under 28
U.S.C. § 1920.‖); BDT Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 405 F.3d
415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005) (―[E]lectronic scanning and imaging
could be interpreted as ‗exemplification and copies of
papers.‘‖); Brown v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 526 F. Supp. 2d 950,
959 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (―[T]he electronic scanning of
documents is the modern-day equivalent of ‗. . . copies of
paper,‘ and, therefore, can be taxed pursuant to § 1920(4).‖).
We agree that scanning and conversion of native files to the
agreed-upon format for production of ESI constitute ―making
copies of materials.‖
In this case, the charges for scanning and TIFF
conversion comprise only approximately $20,000 of the more
than $365,000 in electronic discovery charges awarded in this
case. RTA agrees that the format conversion charges are
authorized under § 1920(4), but asserts that there has been no
showing that the resulting digital copies were necessarily
obtained for use in the case. Once statutory authority to tax
costs has been established, however, the amount awarded is
reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d at 458 (―Given the district court‘s
discretionary equitable power to award costs under Rule
54(d)(1), taxation of costs is reviewed only for abuse of
discretion.‖) (citations omitted). In light of the volume of ESI
produced in this case, we cannot find that the inclusion of all
scanning and TIFF conversion costs was an abuse of the
District Court‘s discretion. Accordingly, we will affirm the
taxation of $20,083.51, representing the scanning and TIFF
conversion undertaken on behalf of Hoosier.8
8

The CCC invoices do not disclose any charge for
scanning or TIFF conversion.
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Although perhaps not falling within the technical
expertise of electronic discovery vendors, the cost of
transferring VHS recordings to DVD format similarly
qualifies as ―making copies.‖ RTA, while acknowledging
that this activity is taxable, disputes the amount taxed,
observing that only 10 of 31 converted videos were produced
to it. Once again, however, the question of the amount of
costs to be taxed for copies necessarily obtained for use in the
case falls within the District Court‘s ample discretion, and we
cannot find an abuse of discretion in the District Court‘s
decision to tax the cost for transferring all of the videos,
totaling $10,286.91.
The District Court, while acknowledging the lack of
controlling precedent and the division of opinion among the
federal courts outside of this Circuit, held that Hoosier and
DMS were entitled to an award of all electronic discovery
charges imposed by their electronic discovery vendors. In
reaching this decision, the District Court placed special
reliance on CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676
F. Supp. 2d 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011).9 In that case, the District Court
rejected the plaintiff‘s objections to the defendant‘s claim for
$243,453.02 in fees charged by the defendant‘s electronic
discovery vendor ―to collect, search, identify and help
produce electronic documents from [the defendant‘s] network
9

After the District Court‘s ruling in the matter before
us, the Federal Circuit vacated the trial court‘s cost rulings
because it had reversed the trial court‘s finding of patent
invalidity. See CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.,
654 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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files and hard drives in response to [the plaintiff‘s] discovery
requests.‖ Id. at 1380. In overruling the plaintiff‘s objection,
the District Court reasoned that the vendor‘s ―highly
technical‖ services were not ―the type of services that
attorneys or paralegals are trained for or are capable of
providing.‖ Id. at 1381. The District Court, acknowledging
the statutory requirement, then remarked that ―[the services]
are the 21st Century equivalent of making copies.‖ Id. The
District Court did not explain how all the various services
performed by the vendor to achieve the production of
electronic documents amounted to ―making copies,‖
seemingly concluding that, because all the various services
were necessary to the ultimate production of electronic
―copies,‖ the services were equivalent to one entire act of
―making copies.‖
The District Court cited the CBT Flint Partners, LLC
Court‘s reasoning in affirming the Clerk of Court‘s taxation
of Hoosier‘s and DMS‘s electronic discovery costs, writing:
―[a] careful review of the vendor‘s invoices reveals that the
services provided were not the type of services that attorneys
or paralegals are trained for or are capable of providing. The
services were highly technical.‖ Race Tires Am., Inc., 2011
WL 1748620, at *9. The District Court also found it
significant that the services performed by Hoosier‘s and
DMS‘s electronic discovery vendors ―to retrieve and prepare
these e-discovery documents for production[,] were an
indispensable part of the discovery process.‖ Id.
Indeed, in the view of courts that have upheld the
taxation of electronic discovery costs pursuant to § 1920(4),
the ―indispensability‖ of the services to the ultimate act of
production of intelligible electronic documents has been a
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significant factor. Those courts, like the CBT Flint Partners,
LLC Court, explain that because the electronic discovery
services are highly technical and beyond the expertise of the
prevailing party‘s own attorneys, the fees that are incurred in
retaining experts to perform the services are unavoidable.
See, e.g., Tibble v. Edison Int’l, No. CV 07-5359, 2011 WL
3759927, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (more than
$500,000 in electronic discovery costs ―necessarily incurred‖
to respond to plaintiff‘s discovery requests were taxable);
Parrish v. Manatt, Phelps, & Phillips, LLP, No. C 10-03200
WHA, 2011 WL 1362112, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011)
(―The tasks of collecting client documents, reviewing those
documents, and determining which documents are relevant
are essential—and often costly—parts of investigation and
discovery.‖). Other courts have pointed to the efficiencies
and cost savings resulting from the efforts of electronic
discovery consultants as justification to tax their charges to
the losing side. See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig.,
2011 WL 4793239, at *3 (―The court is persuaded that in
cases of this complexity, e-discovery saves costs overall by
allowing discovery to be conducted in an efficient and costeffective manner.‖).
The decisions that allow taxation of all, or essentially
all, electronic discovery consultant charges, such as the
District Court‘s ruling in this case, are untethered from the
statutory mooring. Section 1920(4) does not state that all
steps that lead up to the production of copies of materials are
taxable. It does not authorize taxation merely because
today‘s technology requires technical expertise not ordinarily
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possessed by the typical legal professional.10 It does not say
that activities that encourage cost savings may be taxed.
Section 1920(4) authorizes awarding only the cost of making
copies.
It may be that extensive ―processing‖ of ESI is
essential to make a comprehensive and intelligible
production. Hard drives may need to be imaged, the imaged
drives may need to be searched to identify relevant files,
relevant files may need to be screened for privileged or
otherwise protected information, file formats may need to be
converted, and ultimately files may need to be transferred to
different media for production. But that does not mean that
the services leading up to the actual production constitute
―making copies.‖
The process employed in the pre-digital era to produce
documents in complex litigation similarly involved a number
of steps essential to the ultimate act of production. First, the
paper files had to be located. The files then had to be
collected, or a document reviewer had to travel to where the
files were located. The documents, or duplicates of the
documents, were then reviewed to determine those that may
have been relevant. The files designated as potentially
relevant had to be screened for privileged or otherwise
protected material. Ultimately, a large volume of documents
would have been processed to produce a smaller set of
10

Significantly, the District Court in this case
disallowed taxation of OCR and TIFF conversion performed
by the ―Litigation Support Department‖ of the law firm
representing Hoosier, while taxing charges imposed by
vendors for the same activities. (A. 31.)

25

relevant documents. None of the steps that preceded the
actual act of making copies in the pre-digital era would have
been considered taxable. And that is because Congress did
not authorize taxation of charges necessarily incurred to
discharge discovery obligations. It allowed only for the
taxation of the costs of making copies.
The result does not depend upon whether the activities
leading up to the making of copies are performed by third
party consultants with ―technical expertise.‖ As expressed by
one court, ―[s]ection 1920(4) speaks narrowly of ‗[f]ees for
exemplification and copies of papers,‘ suggesting that fees are
permitted only for the physical preparation and duplication of
documents, not the intellectual effort involved in their
production.‖ Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418,
1428 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363
(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Neither the degree of expertise
necessary to perform the work nor the identity of the party
performing the work of ―making copies‖ is a factor that can
be gleaned from §1920(4).
Those courts that have refused to award the costs of
electronic discovery vendors beyond file format conversion
have recognized that gathering, preserving, processing,
searching, culling, and extracting ESI simply do not amount
to ―making copies.‖ For instance, in Mann v. Heckler &
Koch Defense, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-611, 2011 WL 1599580, at *
9 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011), the court observed that ―such
tasks as ‗Searching and Deduping,‘ and ‗Creation of Native
File Database with Full Text and Metadata Extraction,‘‖ do
not qualify as ―copying.‖
Acknowledging the 2008
amendment to § 1920(4) that substituted ―materials‖ for

26

―papers,‖ the court aptly stated that the statute ―still requires
copying.‖ Id. (emphasis omitted). In In re Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 1:01-cv-1950-RWS, 2011 WL
2671296, at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2011), the court analogized
keyword searching to a room full of reviewers physically
reviewing paper documents. Just as the cost of reviewers
examining documents is not taxable, so too the task of
keyword searching is not taxable. Id. In In re Fast Memory
Erase v. Spansion, Inc., the court awarded nearly $200,000
―for creating TIFF/OCR images of documents responsive to
plaintiff‘s discovery requests,‖ but disallowed more than
$860,000 ―for collecting and processing more than 2,100
gigabytes of . . . ESI.‖ No. 3-10-CV-0481-M-BD, 2010 WL
5093945, *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2010). The court found that
data collection and extraction of relevant discoverable ESI
was more like non-taxable attorney and paralegal review than
copying. Id. at *6 (citing Kellogg Brown & Root Int’l, Inc. v.
Altanmia Commercial Mktg. Co., W.W.L., No. H-07-2684,
2009 WL 1457632 at *6 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2009)).
These decisions recognize that ―the types of costs
recoverable under Rule 54(d)(1) are circumscribed.‖ In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d at 457. They are also
consistent with the Supreme Court‘s ―precept that district
courts . . . cannot award costs not enumerated under § 1920.‖
Fells v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 605 F. Supp. 2d 740, 743-44
(E.D. Va. 2009) (refusing to tax costs of processing records,
extracting data, and converting files). Nor may the courts
invoke equitable concerns, as appears to have been an
animating factor in this case, to justify an award of costs for
services that Congress has not made taxable. See Romero,
883 F.2d at 1428.

27

Hoosier argues that the services leading to the ultimate
act of production cannot be parsed into taxable and nontaxable activities, asserting that ―this approach ignores the
reality that many technical processes are necessary for the
production of intelligible electronic copies.‖ (Hoosier‘s Br.
21.) A review of the invoices in this matter belies Hoosier‘s
assertion. As demonstrated by the courts that have taxed the
cost of scanning and file format conversion while not taxing
other activities, it is possible to tax only the costs incurred for
the physical preparation of ESI produced in litigation. See,
e.g., In re Fast Memory Erase, 2010 WL 5093945, at *4
(awarding nearly $200,000 for TIFF/OCR conversion but
disallowing more than $860,000 for collecting and processing
in excess of 2,100 gigabytes of ESI). The highly technical
nature of the services simply does not exempt parties who
seek to recover their electronic discovery costs under
§ 1920(4) from showing that the costs fall within the
subsection‘s limited allowance for ―the costs of making
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily
obtained for use in the case.‖
Furthermore, we do not think it is significant that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the discovery of
ESI or that the parties agreed to ―exchange responsive and
discoverable ESI.‖ (A. 79.) Indeed, there is a ―presumption .
. . that the responding party must bear the expense of
complying with discovery requests.‖ Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). A responding
party, however, ―may invoke the district court‘s discretion
under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‗undue
burden or expense‘ in [complying with discovery requests],
including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting
party‘s payment of the costs of discovery.‖ Id. Here, neither
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Hoosier nor DMS obtained a cost-shifting protective order.
We are consequently limited to shifting only those costs
explicitly enumerated in § 1920.11 Crawford Fitting Co., 482
U.S. at 441.
11

In addition to CBT Flint Partners, LLC, Hoosier
relies on a recent decision from the Federal Circuit, Synopsys,
Inc. v. Ricoh Co. (In re Ricoh Co. Patent Litigation), 661 F.3d
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011), in support of its position that electronic
discovery costs are taxable under § 1920(4). In that case, the
parties had agreed to have a third party vendor load and host
e-mails in native format in a secure document review
database. Id. at 1364-65. Furthermore, the parties agreed to
share the cost of creating and maintaining the document
review database. Id. at 1365. The Federal Circuit, although
finding that the cost of an agreed-upon database that served as
the platform for the parties to obtain documents was taxable,
reversed the District Court‘s award of those costs because the
parties had agreed to share that expense. Id. at 1367. In re
Ricoh Patent Litigation is plainly distinguishable because the
parties had agreed to the creation of a specific document
review database by a specific vendor for document
production purposes, unlike this case, where Hoosier and
DMS retained their own electronic discovery consultants.
Furthermore, we have acknowledged that the costs of
conversion to an agreed-upon production format are taxable
as the functional equivalent of ―making copies.‖ It is all the
other activity, such as searching, culling, and deduplication,
that are not taxable. In re Ricoh Patent Litigation affords no
assistance to Hoosier and DMS in this regard, as it did not
address the question of whether the activities undertaken by
the electronic discovery vendors in this case are the
equivalent of ―making copies.‖
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III.
Neither the language of § 1920(4), nor its history,
suggests that Congress intended to shift all the expenses of a
particular form of discovery—production of ESI—to the
losing party. Nor can such a result find support in Supreme
Court precedent, which has accorded a narrow reading of the
cost statute in other contexts. See, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co.,
482 U.S. at 442. Although there may be strong policy
reasons in general, or compelling equitable circumstances in a
particular case, to award the full cost of electronic discovery
to the prevailing party, the federal courts lack the authority to
do so, either generally or in particular cases, under the cost
statute.12
In sum, we conclude that of the numerous services the
vendors performed, only the scanning of hard copy
documents, the conversion of native files to TIFF, and the
transfer of VHS tapes to DVD involved ―copying,‖ and that
the costs attributable to only those activities are recoverable
under § 1920(4)‘s allowance for the ―costs of making copies
of any materials.‖ Those costs total $30,370.42. We find that
none of the charges imposed by DMS‘s vendor are taxable,
12

Cost-shifting may be effected during the course of
litigation, either by agreement or pursuant to court order
issued under the authority of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. After
litigation, cost-shifting may be ordered as a sanction for
vexatious conduct that reflects bad faith, as opposed to
―misunderstanding, bad judgment, or well-intentioned zeal.‖
LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. First Conn. Holding Grp., LLC, 287
F.3d 279, 289 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
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and that the award in favor of Hoosier should be reduced by
$95,210.13, the difference between the electronic discovery
vendors‘ charges awarded by the District Court ($125,580.55)
and the charges of Hoosier‘s electronic discovery vendors we
find taxable ($30,370.42). We will accordingly vacate the
District Court‘s award of costs and remand to the District
Court to re-tax costs in accordance with this opinion.
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